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ONLY TOO HUMAN:
UNDERSTANDING HEALTH
INSURANCE MARKETS WHEN
CONSUMERS LACK INFORMATION
JONATHAN T. KOLSTAD

VOLUME 2, NUMBER 9

brief in brief
• Good policymaking with respect to regulating health insurance markets requires
a clear understanding of how individual
consumers make insurance choices.
• The traditional model of health insurance
choice assumes that consumers regard
insurance as a purely financial product.
• But in actuality, there are many non-financial

When the state and federal health insurance exchanges were
introduced in 2013, much attention was paid to the logistics
of their launch, particularly the malfunctioning of the online
technology and the need to drive a sufficient number of
consumers (especially younger and healthier consumers) to the
marketplaces so as to make them viable.

factors that affect consumer choice—
notably, people may have inaccurate or
unclear beliefs about their health care
costs and the insurance options available
(“information frictions”); they also have
preferences about the “hassle costs” of
dealing with a particular plan’s reimbursement and billing processes.
• Research shows that information frictions
and perceived hassle costs can cause

Now, as the rollout of the exchanges
approaches its one-year anniversary, policymakers should be looking at a different
question: how can we collect and use data
from the exchanges to understand how
consumers think about insurance choice, so
as to make the exchanges function better?
As research I conducted with my colleague Benjamin Handel shows, doing this
requires a new way of looking at the data
on health insurance consumption.1 The
traditional model of insurance choice treats

insurance as a purely financial product,
sought by fully informed and risk-averse
consumers seeking to protect themselves
from financial loss in the event of illness
or injury.2 Individuals are willing to pay a
higher premium for a plan if it reduces their
expected out-of-pocket spending, and the
extent of their willingness to pay increases in
tandem with their level of risk aversion. The
model assumes that consumers, in selecting
an insurance product, are able to reasonably estimate their expected out-of-pocket

some consumers to disregard insurance
plan options that in fact would be better
for them financially.
• Survey data can help policymakers better
understand consumer decision-making,
and identify needed improvements to consumer education programs and to the
design of the health insurance exchanges.

expenditures, accurately understand the
features of the different insurance options,
and are willing to pay a higher premium
for a plan if it looks to reduce the mean or
variation of out-of-pocket spending.
In actuality, however, modern health
insurance is not a purely financial product.
Many factors besides financial risk protection go into a consumer’s decision of which
insurance plan to purchase.3 People evaluate
plans by the types of care they cover and
the access they give to specific hospitals
and physician networks. Moreover, certain
plan features like Health Savings Accounts
and Flexible Spending Accounts introduce
administrative hassles related to reimbursements and billing that can be off-putting for
some consumers. Choosing insurance thus is
a more complex choice that goes beyond the
straightforward calculation of financial risk;
consumers may be willing to pay more for a
plan with particular non-financial attributes.
Choosing health insurance also is
complex because of “information frictions”—instances of incomplete or inaccurate information. Even if one takes into
account the many facets of health insurance
in the standard model, consumers may not
have a clear understanding of the distinct
attributes of different insurance plans or the
“hassle costs” associated with each one. They
also may not be able to accurately forecast
the costs of becoming sick, especially given
the variety of potential health conditions
they might face, treatment options available,
and the price variations that exist across different treatment locations.4
While the existence of information
frictions seems logical, showing their effects
empirically is challenging, as it requires
access to a substantial amount of data on
insurance plan choices, plan attributes,
as well as consumer beliefs about those
attributes. We were able to surmount this
data hurdle by conducting a study, looking
at health benefits choices made by a group
of employees at a single large firm in 2011
and 2012, in which we were able to combine
1

TABLE 1:

Most of the employees tracked in this data
faced a choice between two different health
insurance options: a Preferred Provider
Organization (PPO) with generous first
dollar coverage, and a High-Deductible
Health Plan (HDHP). In financial terms,

KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TWO PRIMARY PLANS STUDIED

Health Plan Characteristics

PPO

HDHP

Premium

0

0

Health Savings Account (HSA)

No

Yes

HSA Subsidy*

-

$1,500

Max. HSA Contribution**

-

$3,100

Deductible*

0***

$1,500

Coinsurance (IN)

0%

10%

Coinsurance (OUT)

20%

30%

Out-of-Pocket Max.*

0***

$2,500

Provider Network

Same as HDHP

Same as PPO

* Employee+1 Tier is 2x Individual Amount, 3+ tier is 2.5x Individual Amount
** For 2 or more, $6,250 is max. contribution
*** For out-of-network spending, PPO has a deductible of $100 per person (up to $300) and an out-of-pocket max. of $400 per 		
		 person (up to $1200)

consumer information frictions as well as
typically unobservable hassle costs. The
results of our analysis, described below,
point to the need to change the way in
which policymakers and exchange regulators
think about which types of plans to allow,
how those plans should be priced, and how
information about them should be communicated to consumers.

THE DATA
The firm we worked with had over 50,000
employees, the average income of whom was
higher than that of the general population,
and who seemed more likely to have the
education, resources, and cognitive skills
necessary to overcome information frictions.
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detailed administrative data (i.e., data on
actual health insurance choices and patient
claims) with a comprehensive survey in
which the employees’ answers were linked
to the administrative data at the individual
level. The survey was designed to identify
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Richard J. Zeckhauser demonstrates that this tradeoff

to encourage more employees to move to
the HDHP, with the intention of phasing
out the PPO and making the HDHP the
only option by 2013. Consequently, HDHP
enrollment increased to 8.25 percent in
2011 and to 13.25 percent in 2012—still, a
relatively small share of all employees.
Because we also had access to actual
health expenditure data, we were able to
calculate the share of employees that, in
retrospect, would have been better off in the
HDHP. What we found was that, assuming all employees contributed the maximum
amount to their HSA, 73 percent of them
should have switched to the HDHP in
2011—not merely the 8.25 percent that
actually did. Perhaps more striking, even if
employees made no contribution to their
HSA, still 35 percent of them would have
been better off financially in the HDHP.
Why did such a small share of these
employees embrace the HDHP, when so
many of them would have benefitted from
it? Were these employees simply risk-averse,
and therefore more attracted to the financial
characteristics of the PPO? This is what the
traditional model of insurance choice would
suggest. Their behavior could, however,
result from a lack of accurate information
about the different plan features between
the PPO and HDHP, or a lack of understanding about their likely medical expenditures, or beliefs about provider networks
or administrative hassles entailed by one
plan versus the other. It is this possibility we
want to explore further.
In order to measure the extent to
which information frictions and beliefs
about hassle costs and other non-financial
attributes affected the choices made by
these employees, we developed a survey
instrument, which we sent in March 2012
to 4,500 employees across three different
groups: (1) employees that had been in the
HDHP in 2011 and remained in it as of
2012; (2) new 2012 HDHP enrollees; and
(3) those in the PPO plan.
As outlined in Tables 2 and 3, the
design. See “Medical Insurance: A Case Study of the
Tradeoff between Risk Spreading and Appropriate Incentives,” Journal of Economic Theory 2 (1970), 10-26.

survey questions covered four major areas of
benefits selection:
• Knowledge of the financial features of
the HDHP: Could respondents correctly
answer questions requiring knowledge of
the key financial features of the HDHP?
• Beliefs about plan attributes and medical expenses: Did respondents have an
TABLE 2:

• Personal assessment of the effort
respondents devoted to choosing a plan, the
clarity of their beliefs about the available
plans, and their level of satisfaction with
their choice.
Analysis of the survey data indeed
reveals information frictions that basic
administrative data cannot capture. Only

RESPONSE TO PLAN FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS SURVEY QUESTIONS

Question

Correct

Incorrect

Not Sure

What is the deductible under the HDHP?
HDHP-Existing
HDHP-New
PPO

27.08%
52.68
50.79
21.53

22.40%
11.23
13.49
24.66

50.53%
36.10
35.73
53.82

How much is the employer HDHP subsidy?
HDHP-Existing
HDHP-New
PPO

31.42
73.40
68.65
22.50

19.94
11.05
11.21
21.92

48.64
15.54
20.14
55.58

What is the out-of-pocket max. under the HDHP?
HDHP-Existing
HDHP-New
PPO

18.47
28.32
31.87
15.85

21.98
22.11
18.91
22.31

59.55
49.57
49.21
61.84

What is the coinsurance rate under the HDHP?
HDHP-Existing
HDHP-New
PPO

18.56
33.85
29.07
15.66

25.64
21.24
21.37
26.61

55.80
44.91
49.56
57.73

Do you get to keep HSA funds after the end of the year?
HDHP-Existing
HDHP-New
PPO

75.69
96.73
94.22
71.23

9.23
1.38
1.75
10.96

15.08
1.90
4.03
17.81

How much is $1000 worth in pre-tax dollars?
HDHP-Existing
HDHP-New
PPO

14.50
16.93
15.76
14.09

44.86
31.78
42.73
46.58

40.64
51.30
41.51
39.33

accurate understanding of the PPO and
HDHP networks of providers? And could
they accurately assess past and expected
future medical expenditures?
• Time and hassle costs: What did respondents expect about the time required
to manage their HSA and HDHP, and
what was their tolerance for hassle in the
HDHP?

37 percent of employees, for instance, could
correctly estimate how much they had
spent on health care in the previous year,
despite the fact that the majority expressed
confidence in their estimation. Moreover,
only 35 percent of respondents understood
that the provider networks for the PPO and
HDHP were identical, while almost half
answered that they were “not sure” as to how

TABLE 3:

RESPONSES TO PLAN NON-FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS, HASSLE COSTS AND MEDICAL EXPENDITURE SURVEY QUESTIONS

Question
How do the provider networks of the to plans compare?
HDHP-Existing
HDHP-New
PPO
How much do you expect to spend in the HDHP?
HDHP-Existing
HDHP-New
PPO
...in the PPO?
PPO

Same
34.52%
41.28
49.39
32.09

HDHP bigger
6.04%
6.74
3.33
6.26

PPO bigger
12.46%
2.76
4.20
14.48

None
1.76%
5.18
3.50
1.17

<1 hour
5.99%
19.17
14.71
3.52

1.5 hours
21.73%
46.11
40.81
16.83

6-10 hours
17.40%
17.62
22.24
16.83

11-20 hours
12.88%
5.53
11.21
13.89

>20 hours
24.92%
6.39
7.53
28.96

Not sure
15.34%
18.79

15.85

29.75

29.16

11.35

2.94

4.11

6.85

Understand,
not concerned
How do you feel about spending time managing your health plan? 14.82%
HDHP-Existing
39.03
HDHP-New
26.62
PPO
10.76

Accept,
but concerned
42.52%
32.64
39.05
44.04

Correct
36.66%
41.97
37.13
36.01

How confident are you in this estimate?
HDHP-Existing
HDHP-New
PPO

Very confident
35.85%
38.34
30.11
36.20

Somewhat confident
43.90%
49.22
46.13
43.05

Not confident
20.25%
12.44
23.77
20.74

Yes
16.49%

No
58.35%

Not sure
25.16%

56.65
30.47
10.37

23.83
42.91
63.99

19.52
26.62
25.64

the networks of the two plans compared.
The level of incorrect and uncertain beliefs
about a plan attribute like provider network
that is relatively straightforward, as well as
described clearly in information provided by
the employer, only underscores the extent to
which information frictions exist. And the
existence of these information frictions was
consequential. Respondents who believed
(incorrectly) that the PPO had the larger
provider network only chose the HDHP 6
percent of the time, even though they would
have been better off doing so 40 percent of
the time.
The results also are revealing with
regard to hassle costs. Compared to those

Overestimate
29.81%
35.75
27.85
29.35

Don’t like,
no matter what
42.65%
28.32
34.33
45.21

How much was spent on you and your dependents in 2011?
HDHP-Existing
HDHP-New
PPO

Do you think you will benefit/would have benefited
from the HDHP in 2012?
HDHP-Existing
HDHP-New
PPO

Not sure
46.98%
49.22
43.08
47.16

who had direct experience with the HDHP,
a much larger share of PPO respondents
believed that they would need to spend at
least 20 hours of their time to deal with it.
Almost 90% of the PPO enrollees expressed
at least some concern about the amount of
time required to manage the HDHP, even
though they did not have direct experience
with that plan.
In sum, the results confirm that
information frictions exist within many of
the key choice dimensions that consumers
consider when purchasing health insurance.
They also suggest that information frictions
and perceived hassle costs play a critical role
in shaping consumer choice.

Underestimate
23.31%
16.41
23.47
24.07

Not sure
10.22%
5.87
11.56
10.57

QUANTIFYING THE IMPACT
Taking the analysis one step further, we
developed a series of econometric models
to put the impact of information frictions
and hassle costs into quantifiable, monetary
terms. We created a “baseline model,” which
captures the traditional view of health insurance choice as a purely financial decision;
a “baseline model with inertia,” to account
for the propensity of people to allow their
insurance choice to simply roll over from
year to year; and then a “full model” that
adds in five additional factors: information
about plan design features; provider network
knowledge; consumers’ information on their

own health expenditures; knowledge of
HSA tax benefits; and preferences regarding
time and hassle costs.
The results of the full model were telling in explaining why so many employees
in our sample chose the PPO plan, despite
the fact that a clear majority of them would
have been better off with the HDHP. Just
looking at information about plan design
features, we found that a single incorrect
answer about the HDHP causes a consumer
to value the HDHP by $220 less than a
consumer with full, accurate information.
Moreover, those who believed (again, incorrectly) that the PPO has a larger network
of medical providers valued the HDHP by
$1,726 less than a consumer that understood the provider networks are actually
identical. Those who underestimated their
own annual medical expenditures valued the
HDHP by $279 less than someone who had
correct knowledge of those expenditures.
But it was preferences regarding time and
hassle costs that were the most impactful.
Those who indicated a “strong distaste” for
hassle costs valued the HDHP by $87 less
for each additional stated hour of insurancerelated billing, logistics, and administrative
tasks. Taken together, information frictions
and hassle costs in some cases caused consumers to value the HDHP by more than
$1,000 less than identical individuals that
did not face these frictions—and, consequently, led many of them to select the PPO
option, even though they would have been
better off with the HDHP.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Our research carries important implications
for health care policy, particularly since
more employers and policymakers have
been looking specifically to HDHPs to help
incentivize consumers to reduce “wasteful”
medical expenditures. However, switching to
these plans does place an increased financial
risk burden on consumers, so it is important
to understand whether the switch is “worth
it”—i.e., whether the social benefits from
reduced wasteful expenditures are greater

than the welfare loss faced by consumers
from the increased financial risk exposure of
the HDHP.5
To explore this issue, we went back
to our data to assess the welfare impact of
forcing all the employees in our sample that
opted for the PPO to switch to the HDHP.
In this, we restricted ourselves to examining
the specific aspects of insurance choice that
are the most welfare-relevant: risk preferences; out-of-pocket health care expenditure
risk; and idiosyncratic plan preferences. And
again, we assessed consumer welfare using
our three different models: the baseline
model, the baseline model with inertia, and
the full model that includes information
frictions and hassle costs.
By our calculations, the baseline model,

“Only 37 percent of employees
could correctly estimate how
much they had spent on
health care in the previous
year, despite the fact that the
majority expressed confidence
in their estimation.”

where consumers are assumed to be very
risk averse, predicts an average consumer
welfare loss of $1,475 from forcing consumers to shift from the PPO to the HDHP.
However, we found that when we account
for information and hassle costs, risk
aversion among consumers goes down. In
other words, when consumers are better
informed about plan features and expected
hassle costs, they are more willing to choose
the HDHP. Consequently they are not as
risk averse as one would predict without
accounting for information frictions and
they are less impacted by the heightened
risk that an HDHP entails. So the welfare
loss experienced by consumers goes down
as well—in our calculations, by two-thirds,
when compared to the baseline model.

But is the reduction in welfare loss
sufficient to warrant, in this case, forcing
consumers into an HDHP? One needs to
tradeoff the welfare loss from increased risk
exposure in the HDHP policy with the savings from reduced use of medical care due
to having a higher deductible. Our results
suggest that, after accounting for information frictions, the welfare loss is about
equal to the gains from reduced use of care.
Therefore, the policy could be justified using
standard estimates for consumer response
to prices after accounting for information
frictions but using the standard model we
would reach the opposite conclusion.
What does all of this modeling mean
for policymakers? Good policymaking
with respect to regulating health insurance
markets requires a clear understanding of
how individual consumers make insurance
choices, as well as the potential impact on
consumer welfare of limiting or modifying
the choice environment. As the research
indicates, policymakers need to factor into
their thinking not simply the financial
incentives that drive consumer behavior
in purchasing health insurance, but also
the ways in which uncertainty about plan
features and beliefs about the hassle of
enrolling in high deductible plans shape
behavior as well.
Moreover, the research shows the power
of linking survey data with administrative data to obtain a more accurate and
nuanced picture of how consumers value
health insurance and make insurance plan
decisions. Now that the health insurance
exchanges have been up and running for a
year, policy analysts should consider implementing surveys that capture the actual level
of knowledge among consumers, to better
understand consumer risk preferences and
to use that understanding to improve both
consumer education programs as well as the
design of the exchanges themselves. As our
research suggests, there is still much that
can be done to make sure the exchanges
account for the full complexity of health
insurance decision-making.
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